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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - COURT CONSENT TO PLEA BARGAINS
A plea bargain is an agreement by one accused of a crime to
plead guilty to a certain crime in return for a promise from the
district attorney, the court, or both, that the accused will receive
a moderate sentence or immunity from prosecution for other
offenses. Plea bargains may involve matters within the sole dis-
cretion of the trial judge, or of the district attorney, or within
the discretion of both; thus, the question arises who are the
necessary parties to the agreement. Since sentencing is a func-
tion of the trial judge,' plea bargains involving promises of less
severe sentences necessarily require court's consent to be en-
forceable. However, in many plea bargains the accused pleads
guilty to one offense and receives a promise of immunity from
prosecution for other offenses for which he is or may be charged,
or he pleads guilty to a felony on the promise that he will not
be charged as a multiple offender.2 It is in this situation that
the requirement of court consent to enforce plea bargains is
subject to question.
The question whether plea bargains promising immunity
from further prosecution require court consent has sometimes
been solved by determining the prosecutor's power to nolle prose-
qui an indictment.3 A number of states require court consent
before the prosecutor can nolle prosequi an indictment; they also
require court consent before the prosecutor can grant the ac-
cused immunity from prosecution.4 Other states allow the prose-
cutor to nolle prosequi without court consent ;5 of these only one6
1. LA. R.S. 15:529 (1950) : "Whenever any person is sentenced to imprison-
ment, after having been found guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea, it shall be
the duty of the judge to impose a determinate sentence."
2. The Habitual Offender Law does not make it a crime to be a multiple
offender but merely provides enhanced sentence for the basic offense. E.g.,
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912) ; State v. George, 218 La. 18, 48
So. 2d 265 (1950) ; State v. Hardy, 174 La. 458, 141 So. 27 (1932); State v.
Guidry, 169 La. 215, 124 So. 832 (1929).
3. See Smith v. Embry, 103 Ga. App. 375, 119 S.E.2d 45 (1961); Kidd v.
Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 498, 74 S.W.2d 944 (1934); Earl v. Winne, 34 N.J.
Super. 605, 112 A.2d 791 (1955) ; State v. Furmage, 250 N.C. 616, 109 S.E.2d
563 (1959) ; Hughes v. James, 86 Okla. Crim. 231, 190 P.2d 824 (1948) ; State
v. Keep, 85 Ore. 265, 166 Pac. 936 (1917) ; Commonwealth v. Barnard, 94 Pa.
Super. 403 (1928) ; Surginer v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. 438, 217 S.W. 145 (1919) ;
State v. Persons, 117 Vt. 556, 96 A.2d 818 (1953) ; Denham v. Robinson, 72 W.Va.
243, 77 S.E. 970 (1913) ; State ex rel. Kowaleski v. District Court of Milwaukee
County, 254 Wis. 363, 36 N.W.2d 419 (1949).
4. Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913) ; State v. Ander-
son, 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174 (1930).
5. LA. R.S. 15:329 (1950) ; State v. Dennington, 51 Del. 322, 145 A.2d 80
(1958) ; People v. Bogolowski, 326 Ill. 253, 157 N.E. 181 (1927) ; State ex rel.
Griffin v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235, 258 S.W.2d 590 (1953).
6. The scarcity of jurisprudence indicates the problem is avoided either by
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has directly passed upon the question whether court consent is
needed for the granting of immunity from prosecution, holding
no consent is necessary. 7
The American Law Institute Model Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure recommends that no prosecution should be dismissed ex-
cept by court order and for good cause accompanied by a writ-
ten statement to be entered on the record.8 The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure require "leave of court" for the dismis-
sal of an indictment by the United States Attorney."
In Louisiana the district attorney is empowered to enter a
nolle prosequi without court consent.'0 The validity of a plea
bargain granting immunity from further prosecution entered
without court approval was at issue res nova in State v. Hingle.11
Defendant had withdrawn a plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty
to a lesser offense after receiving the district attorney's promise
that all other offenses against him would be dismissed, and that
no multiple offender charges would be filed. Subsequently, de-
fendant was charged as a multiple offender. On original hearing
the Louisiana Supreme Court held a plea bargain granting immu-
nity from sentence not binding unless the trial judge was a party
to the agreement. On rehearing, however, the trial judge's con-
sent was admitted by the district attorney and the court held
the plea bargain barred a multiple offender sentence. The court
prosecutors obtaining court consent or consistently keeping their part of the bar-
gain. Although not faced directly with the question whether court consent is
needed to grant immunity from prosecution, some courts in dicta have indicated
bargains made by the prosecutor alone will be enforced. State v. Ward, 112 W.Va.
522, 165 S.E. 803 (1932); People v. Siciliano, 185 Misc. 149, 56 N.Y.S.2d 80
(1945).
In Tullis v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 87, 88, 52 S.W. 83, 84 (1899) the court said
granting immunity from prosecution was a function of the trial judge and al-
though an agreement to turn state's evidence, made with the prosecuting officer,
"should be made . . . with the consent of the court, yet . . . where . . . made
[without its consent] . . . and . . . defendant has acted in perfect good faith,
it should be recognized by the court." However, if made over the objection of the
court Tullig indicated it should not be enforced.
In some jurisdictions in which the prosecuting attorney is powerless to nolle
proaequi without consent of court, courts have intimated in dicta that the prosecu-
tor could, if he had complete authority to nolle prosequi, grant immunity by con-
tract without court approval. Commonwealth v. St. John, 173 Mass. 566, 54 N.E.
254 (1899) ; Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913).
7. People v. Bogolowski, 326 I1. 253, 157 N.E. 181 (1927).
8. MODEL CODE OF CalM. PROC. § 295 (1930).
9. FED. R1. CRIM. PROC. Rule 48(a).
10. LA. R.S. 15:329 (1950): "The exercise of the power to enter a nolle
prosequi is a matter that shall be subject to the sound discretion and control of
the district attorney, and in order to exercise that power he shall not have to
obtain the consent or permission of the court."
11. 242 La. 844, 139 So. 2d 205 (1962).
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on rehearing intimated in dictum, however, that such an agree-
ment made without approval of the trial judge would be en-
forced.12 The effect of Hingle, therefore, is to enforce promises
of immunity consented to by the court; but it left unsettled
whether court consent is necessary in Louisiana for the district
attorney to be bound by a plea bargain promising the accused
immunity from further prosecution, either as a multiple offend-
er' 3 or upon other charges.
The enforcement of promises of immunity from prosecution
made by a prosecuting officer with consent of the court has been
justified on grounds of public policy.1 4 These promises are treat-
ed as pledges of public faith by some courts,' 5 while others have
held the defendant has an equitable right of immunity in the
absence of express statutory authorization. 16 Promises of im-
munity in cases involving a co-defendant who agrees to testify
as a state's witness have been held binding on the rationale that
an opposite result would be a denial of due process, since the ac-
cused has a constitutional right to refuse to offer testimony that
might tend to incriminate him. 17 The Louisiana Supreme Court
has upheld a plea bargain made with court consent on the theory
that by pleading guilty the defendant surrendered "substantial
12. A strong concurring opinion disagreed with this dictum, pointing out that
in Louisiana a nolle prosequi does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense, the district attorney's power to nolle prosequi being procedural, whereas
a grant of immunity from prosecution is a complete bar to prosecution. The con-
curring Justice also expressed the view that verbal agreements made between the
accused and the district attorney would provide a prolific source of litigation and
open the door to many abuses in plea bargaining.
13. Although the Multiple Offender Act has been construed as providing an
enhanced sentence for the basic offense rather than constituting a separate crime
(see note 2 supra), the majority opinion on rehearing in Hingle indicated that
the district attorney could enter into plea bargains granting immunity from such
enhanced sentences as well as immunity from prosecution for other crimes. This
would seem justified since LA. R.S. 15:529.1 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1958,
No. 469, § 1, gives the district attorney full discretion to bring multiple offender
charges.
14. Plea bargains have been recognized as a useful and necessary part of the
executive and judicial criminal process which furnishes a means of disposing of
numerous cases which would otherwise clog the court dockets. When properly
used it has been looked upon favorably by lawyers, district attorneys, courts, and
defendants alike. See generally Comment, 50 YALE L.J. 107 (1940).
15. E.g., Commonwealth v. St. John, 173 Mass. 566, 54 N.E. 254 (1899)
State v. Ward, 112 W. Va. 552, 165 S.E. 803 (1932).
16. E.g., Cortes v. State, 135 Fla. 589, 185 So. 323 (1938). See generally
Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiation of Prosecution, 23 J. Canr. L., C. & P.S. 770,
789 (1933).
17. Scribner v. State, 9 Okla. Crim. 465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913). See Newman,
Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRiM. L.,
C. & P.S. 780, 789 (1956).
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rights" and that a denial of the benefits promised would have
been a violation of due process.' 8
Jurisdictions requiring court consent before the prosecuting
attorney can nolle prosequi an indictment have refused to recog-
nize a prosecuting attorney's authority to grant immunity from
further prosecution on the theory that holding otherwise would
defeat the very purpose for which the requirement of court con-
sent was adopted. 19 Further, it has been held that a court should
not enforce pledges of immunity made by the executive depart-
ment and that the defendant's only remedy is a pardon from the
department that purported to grant the immunity.
2
Enforcement of a plea bargain involving a plea of guilty to
an offense in return for a promise from the prosecuting attor-
ney which is within his power to fulfill seems justifiable even
though the plea bargain lacks the court's consent. Not only is
the prosecuting attorney a public representative whose promise
is a pledge of the public faith which should be duly kept,21 but
it seems a defendant who pleads guilty to an offense in consid-
eration of a plea bargain would be giving up the same "substan-
tial right" - the right to stand trial - whether the court con-
sented to the plea bargain or not. Furthermore, statutes which
have placed the power of nolle prosequi solely within the discre-
tion of the district attorney seem indicative of a legislative in-
tent that the district attorney should be able to promise to nolle
prosequi certain charges in return for a plea of guilty. Thus, it
is submitted that courts may properly enforce promises made by
the district attorney without court consent where those promises
are within the district attorney's power to fulfill and that justice
would be better served by protecting defendants who enter into
such agreements believing the district attorney will be bound
thereby.22
Willie H. Barfoot
18. State v. Mockosher, 205 La. 434, 17 So. 2d 575 (1944).
19. People v. Groves, 63 Cal. App. 709, 219 Pac. 1033 (1923) ; Frady v.
People, 96 Colo. 43, 40 P.2d 606 (1934).
20. Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878) ; United States v. Blaisdell, 24 Fed.
Cas. 1162 (No. 14,608) (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1869) ; Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1, 73
Atl. 637 (1909) ; State v. Lopez, 19 Mo. 254 (1853) ; Bruno v. State, 192 Tenn.
244, 240 S.W.2d 528 (1951).
21. See Commonwealth v. St. John, 172 Mass. 566, 54 N.E. 254 (1899) ; Cam-
ron v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 180, 22 S.W. 682 (1893).
22. To assure better understanding of the terms and conditions of plea bar-
gains, and to protect the defendant in the event the prosecutor has a lapse of
memory or is succeeded by a prosecutor knowing nothing of an oral agreement
between his predecessor and the accused, it seems the better practice is to have
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